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Introduction
1 Recent  years  have  seen increased interest  in  the  complex relationships  between the
thought of German Idealists (understood to include both transcendental and absolute
idealists)  and the thought of  those philosophers commonly categorized as “American
Pragmatists” – from Charles S. Peirce (the progenitor of this alleged tradition) to Richard
Rorty and his student, Robert Brandom. This issue presents a collection of papers that, as
a collection, do justice to those complex relationships, neither pretending that idealism
and  pragmatism  are  natural  allies,  nor  pretending  that they  are,  essentially,  rivals.
Readers who seek critical perspectives on these relationships will find this issue has much
to offer. However, there is also no shortage of insights on the agreements or points of
convergence  between  idealism  and  pragmatism.  This  mixed  approach  to  their
relationships, even if it is ultimately more critical than it is positive, reflects the very
attitudes  of  many pragmatist  authors  toward  the  thought  of  German Idealists,  from
Peirce’s and Dewey’s own mixed evaluations of Kant and Hegel, to Lewis’s rejection of the
transcendental a priori in favor of the “pragmatic a priori,” to figures such as Royce, who
sees  his  work  as  both  Hegelian  and  pragmatist.  Inasmuch  as  pragmatist  authors
themselves  comprise  an  extended  and  querulous  family,  so  in  relating  them to  the
German Idealists, we only extend that querulous family even further.
2 We begin with Willem deVries’s “From Idealism to Pragmatism: a Matter of Evolution.”
Distinguishing between two modern types of idealism, one motivated by epistemological
concerns and traceable to Descartes, and the other motivated directly by metaphysical
concerns and characteristic of Hegel, deVries argues that pragmatism is distinct from
idealism, as pragmatists are motivated most directly by a concern for practice, such as (in
Peirce) the practice of inquiry. But while pragmatism never falls back into idealism, it has
in common with idealism “the priority of system.” Next is Vincent Colapietro’s “Actuality
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and Intelligibility,” which turns to Peirce’s famous criticism of Hegel, that, in his system,
Hegel fails to give proper priority to the role of “Secondness” or “active oppugnancy” in
experience, making “Thirdness” or reason the primary metaphysical principle. Colapietro
argues that, to the contrary, a deeper look at the role of conflict in Hegel’s system shows
not only that this criticism is unfair, but also, Hegel and Peirce aside, how akin experience
and reason actually are. Continuing with Peirce, Aaron B. Wilson contends that, while
Peirce’s philosophy is not consistent with idealism insofar as the latter assumes we can
have a priori knowledge, Peirce’s “hypothesis of the Final Opinion” can be viewed as a
“transcendental  feature”  of  his  system,  as  it  explains  how  knowledge  in  general  is
possible; moreover, it does so in a way that resembles the “Absolute” of absolute idealism.
However,  the  hypothesis  of  the  Final  Opinion  is  not  epistemically  independent  of
experience, since the hypothesis is an abduction from experience. 
3 Turning  to  other  members  of  the  pragmatist  family,  in  “Reclaiming  the  Power  of
Thought,”  Jörg  Volbers  examines  Dewey’s  own  ambivalent  attitude  toward  idealism.
Dewey  at  once  defends  idealism  as  an  historical  improvement  over  authority-based
systems, and criticizes it for subordinating practical activity to intellectual activity. For
Dewey,  both  forms  of  activity  form  a  dynamic,  temporal  whole,  which  is  key  to
understanding experience and rationality. In “Voluntarism: A Difference that Makes the
Difference  between  German  Idealism  and  American  Pragmatism?,”  Daniel  Brunson
examines  how  Royce’s  voluntarism,  which  treats  will as  more  fundamental
(metaphysically)  than  intellect,  offers  a  way  of  distinguishing  between  idealism and
pragmatism.  Providing  rich  historical  detail,  Brunson  surveys  the  thought  of  and
exchanges between Royce, Peirce, Dewey, Schiller and others to suggest how any contest
between idealism and pragmatism could be recast as one between intellectualism and
voluntarism.  The influence of  the early pragmatists notwithstanding,  Terry Pinkard’s
“Conceptualistic Pragmatism” contends that the thought of C. I. Lewis was the dominate
formative  influence  in  the  development  of  post-war  pragmatism,  providing  the
framework for Quine, Sellars, Rorty and Brandom. Further, although there are important
differences between Lewis and the post-Kantian idealists, Lewis engages the very debates
the German idealists had among themselves, thereby passing those debates onto the post-
war pragmatists. Finally, in “Hegel and the Ethics of Brandom’s Metaphysics,” Jonathan
Lewis examines Brandom’s appropriation of key themes in German Idealism, particularly
the normativity of meaning, and argues that, unlike Hegel, Brandom fails to respect the
ethical dimensions of this normativity. Brandom mistakenly divorces ethical concerns
from meaning normativity; but Lewis suggests that a Hegelian solution to this inadequacy
in Brandom would undercut a key assumption of his inferential semantics.
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